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The Off-Label Use of Consumer Credit Ratings 
Akos Rona-Tas ∗ 
Abstract: »Zulassungsüberschreitende Anwendung von Konsumenten-Kredit-
würdigkeit«. Sovereign, corporate and consumer credit ratings are used to as-
sess the creditworthiness of borrowers. Yet these ratings often fulfill other 
functions as well, serving as measures of more general qualities of countries, 
businesses and individuals. When ratings are used outside the context of lend-
ing, we call it ‘off-label use.’ This paper develops the argument in the context 
of consumer lending and discusses the use of credits scores in the U.S. by car 
insurance companies in calculating premiums, landlords in selecting tenants, 
and employers in hiring workers. We argue that off-label use can have harmful 
effects through two mechanisms: error propagation and enhanced performa-
tivity. Both amplify small initial differences, exacerbate inequalities, lock bor-
rowers in upward or downward spirals and increase economic inequalities. Tur-
bo performativity results when measures influenced by earlier credit scores 
become direct inputs for calculating new credit scores. Off-label use of con-
sumer ratings, therefore, should be treated not just as a privacy issue but also 
as a factor in economic polarization. 
Keywords: Credit scores, insurance, hiring, residential rental, performativity, 
inequality. 
1.  Introduction  
Credit ratings recently have found a variety of new uses. Ratings developed in 
retail lending, called credit scores are now routinely used in fields such as auto 
insurance assessments, cell phone contracts, residential rentals and even hiring 
decisions. The proliferation of credit ratings is not limited to credit scores. 
Corporate ratings designed to assess companies, became deployed to evaluate 
local governments and structured financial instruments such as mortgage 
backed securities and applied not just to evaluate but also to create those in-
struments. It has also been alleged that unsolicited corporate ratings have been 
used as a “marketing device” by rating agencies to punish corporations reluc-
tant to order the agencies’ services.1 The use of corporate ratings for regulatory 
                                                             
∗  Akos Rona-Tas, Department of Sociology, University of California, San Diego, USA;  
aronatas@ucsd.edu. 
1  A famous example is Jefferson County School District No.R-1 vs. Moody’s Investor’s Services, 
where Moody’s famously won on First Amendment grounds, <http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ 
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purposes is yet another example of their off-label use.2 The use of sovereign 
ratings, the gauge of the reliability of government bonds and the likelihood of 
sovereign default has also been expanded and is now routinely employed as the 
measure of a country’s overall economic performance and a measure of eco-
nomic and political stability.  
The increasing versatility of credit ratings is yet another sign of the growing 
role of finance in modern life (Deutschmann 2011). Financialization, the term 
often used to describe the way society becomes dominated by finance, spawned 
a large literature devoted to documenting the swelling of the relative size of the 
financial industry (Krippner 2011), the increasing influence of financial mar-
kets in the governance of non-finance companies (Fligstein 1990, 2008; Dob-
bin and Zorn 2005), and the various ways households become directly depend-
ent on the financial world, either by means of indebtedness or by investing their 
savings in financial instruments (Sullivan et al. 2000; Hyman 2011; Harrington 
2008; Keister 2000; Frank 2000). All of these, at different levels, testify to the 
expansion of finance, the pushing of its boundaries to encompass larger and 
larger segments of the social world. Throughout this expansion, finance lays 
claims to new territories by redefining old problems as those of the flow of 
money that then must be addressed by the logic and tools of finance. As finan-
cialization is moving forward, many of its instruments, developed in the specif-
ic context of a particular financial transaction come to be utilized for novel 
purposes, outside their original context. In this paper, I will focus on credit 
ratings, a tool developed for credit transactions. When credit ratings are used in 
new ways outside the context of credit granting, I call it off-label use.  
Off-label use is a common form of financial innovation. An early case of 
off-label use was the adoption of commodities futures contracts created to 
smooth the lumpy production cycle in agriculture to any commodity and finally 
to any financial instrument (Pinzur 2016). The securitization of mortgages is 
another example of off-label use, as mortgages originally devised to promote 
home ownership were repurposed as investment vehicles (Quinn 2010). In both 
cases, the shift to off-label usage created new opportunities as well as prob-
lems. For the case of futures contracts, new opportunities for risk hedging were 
                                                                                                                                
us-10th-circuit/1211589.html> (Accessed February 6, 2017). A subsequent investigation by 
the U.S. Justice Department Antitrust Division did not result in criminal charges. The litera-
ture on this issue is split. There is general agreement that unsolicited ratings are lower, but 
it is hard to separate self-selection (bad companies not soliciting ratings) and agency pres-
sure. Another way of achieving similar results is “notching.” It is the practice of automati-
cally reducing the rating given by another rating agency for a structured financial collateral 
such as a CDO. This too is an off label use of corporate ratings.  
2  The rating is created to serve the investor. The interest of the investor is not necessarily the 
same as that of the regulator. For instance, the regulator has an overriding interest in min-
imizing global, systemic risk, while investors want to maximize their own local profit 
(Partnoy 1999; Darbellay and Partnoy 2012). 
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coupled with the blurring between investment and gambling as the expansion 
of futures detached these transactions from the actual, physical commodities as 
collateral. The securitization of mortgages made mortgage lending less depend-
ent on local savings, but weakened the incentives of the mortgage originator to 
lend prudently. In both of these examples, however, the original and the new 
purpose remained within the world of finance and going off-label did not 
stretch the instrument beyond financial markets. 
This is true for some off-label use of credit ratings as well. Adapting corpo-
rate ratings to structured finance keeps ratings within financial markets, so is 
the rating used as a blueprint in the construction of products like Residential 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) or Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDO). Their use as a coercive marketing tool stretches “the label” much fur-
ther. The off-label use of credit ratings of individuals, however, moves the 
ratings beyond the realm of finance. There is no financial theory that would 
argue that coercive marketing is a necessary part of financial markets. 
2.  What is Off-Label Use? 
I call ‘off-label’ any use of a product, which is different from what it was origi-
nally intended for. Off-label use, like employing diapers as fire-retardant, ten-
nis balls as caps on chair legs to protect floors, or baking soda as toothpaste, is 
quite common. The term originates in medicine, and it designates the use of 
drugs for purposes unapproved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(Cohen 1997; Henry 1999; Dresser and Frader 2009).3 With a few exceptions, 
off-label use of drugs is not illegal but raises certain questions about safety and 
liability. Off-label use is always a matter of degree. Using Adderall or Ritalin 
approved for childhood attention deficit disorder to treat adult attention prob-
lems is a smaller stretch than taking anti-seizure medication to treat migraines 
or anti-anxiety pills as sleeping aids, and much smaller still than using antibiot-
ics as growth promoters in animals.4 
There is often a narrative explaining why the unintended and novel use is re-
lated to the one originally intended for the product. The new use is justified 
with reference to the original purpose but changing some conditions or renego-
tiating certain boundaries. Where childhood ends and adult age begins for 
amphetamines or methylphenidates is not a simple question. Migraines and 
seizures can also be hard to tell apart. In some cases, such as using epilepsy 
medication for weight loss, there is no attempt to link the new use to the origi-
                                                             
3  To some extent I am using the term ‘off-label’ off-label, that is, in a way that was originally 
not intended. In rhetoric, this is often referred to as metaphoric extension.  
4  Off-label uses often become on-label, as it happened with aspirin that was prescribed to 
lower the risk of heart attack, and was approved by the FDA for that purpose in 1998. 
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nal indication and the justification simply rests on claims that “it works.”5 What 
is on- and what is off-label use when it comes to pharmaceuticals are decided by 
the precise language of written regulations that try to stake out clearly the condi-
tions and boundaries of product use. In the area of credit rating, I will talk about 
off-label use when credit rating is not used to directly aid lenders to assess the 
likelihood of future good payment behavior of prospective borrowers. 
In this paper, I argue that the extension of the use of credit ratings beyond 
this limited purpose has negative side effects, and I will focus on two types in 
particular. The first type is when negative effects present in the original – on 
label – use spread with the off-label application to new areas. If Ritalin causes 
abdominal pain, its extension to adults transfers this problem to a new popula-
tion. For credit ratings, this means that with the proliferation of credit ratings, 
errors in them that used to plague only the appropriate assessment of creditwor-
thiness now will propagate to new contexts unrelated to credit.  
The second type is when off-label use has an effect on an instrument’s utili-
ty in its original context. For instance, the overuse of antibiotics not just be-
stows its side effects such as diarrhea or nausea to new users but it also weak-
ens its use in curing infections in humans. In the case of antibiotics, the 
mechanism through which off-label uses (such as its use for human sickness 
most likely to be caused by viral infection or for growth promotion in food 
animals) influence on-label use is well known. Bacteria, through natural selec-
tion, become immune to overused antibiotics, making drugs less effective over 
time. There is a negative feedback. Success earlier breeds failure later.  
For credit rating, there is a positive feedback in the very process of credit 
evaluation: a poor credit record elicits a lower rating and worse payment condi-
tions, reducing the chances of better future behavior. At the same time, good 
behavior earns higher rating, higher rating results in more favorable conditions 
which makes better future performance easier. Positive feedback can result in 
vicious or virtuous cycles trapping people in poverty or locking in their privi-
leges all the while accentuating initial advantages (DiPrete and Eirich 2006; 
Pager and Shepherd 2008).6 But while this positive feedback may be insidious 
for society at large and some individuals in particular, it actually makes credit 
rating, to some extent, more and not less effective as a tool of prediction. If 
good ratings make you a better and bad ratings a worse borrower, that will 
make the ratings predict more accurately. Because of this positive feedback, the 
efficacy of the instrument and its social utility become misaligned. Trapping 
people in good or bad cycles (a social bad) will make ratings more effective. In 
other words, ratings not just predict what will happen, but, to some extent, they 
                                                             
5  See e.g. <http://scienceblogs.com/retrospectacle/2006/08/29/common-drugs-being-used-offlab> 
(Accessed February 7, 2017). 
6  The large literature on path dependence and increasing returns to scale also useful in un-
derstanding these processes (Arthur 1994; Rona-Tas 1997). 
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also help it come true. In this sense, they are “performative.” Off-label use of 
credit rating further augments this positive feedback and we call the result 
“enhanced performativity.”7 By introducing additional penalties in other areas 
of life for a missed loan payment or a default, off-label use of ratings also acts 
as a powerful disciplining device in lending, provided that people understand 
all consequences of their bad credit behavior.  
In what follows, I will explain how off-label use of credit rating of individu-
als creates negative side effects, through the mechanisms of error propagation 
and performativity. Then I will make an argument for banning the off-label use 
of credit ratings through stronger privacy protection.  
3.  Error Propagation  
When used on-label, credit ratings, be it individual credit scores, corporate or 
sovereign ratings, perform two essential functions; one is passive, and the other 
is active. In their passive role, they are an assessment of a potential borrower’s 
creditworthiness given some general assumptions about how the world works.8 
They are descriptions and some kind of reflections of the would-be borrowers’ 
past and current conditions. Ratings try to capture all relevant information and 
organize them into a prediction of the applicant’s future credit behavior, which 
is expected to unfold under the circumstances captured by the rating. 
The most common complaint about the on-label use of ratings is that the 
measures used to calculate it are full of errors and those measurement errors 
add to the prediction error. Error of either type (measurement or prediction) can 
be thought of as being akin to a pill’s side effect. Ratings in time t (ܴ௧) are 
calculated as a function of a set of characteristics observed in time t (ܺ௧) with 
some measurement (ߝ௧ ) and prediction (݁௧) error.  
ܴ௧=ߚ(ܺ௧ + ߝ௧) + ݁௧ 
Even if the errors are overall small and random, there is the problem of what 
one may call the ‘asymmetry of aggregation.’ The asymmetry of aggregation 
means that consequences affect borrowers at the individual level, while large 
lenders like banks and investment funds, face these errors only in the aggre-
gate. Thus while borrowers care how ratings err in their own, individual case, 
                                                             
7  MacKenzie (2006) calls positive feedback Barnesian performativity. It is also known as self-
fulfilling prophecy (Merton 1948). Negative feedback is sometimes referred to as “negative 
performativity” or “self-frustrating prophecy.” In economic sociology, performativity refers 
to the power of economic ideas to shape reality in line with their own predictions (Callon 
1998, 2008; MacKenzie et al 2007; Rona-Tas and Guseva 2014). 
8  For instance, it is assumed that the borrowers are individually responsible for payment, that 
their trajectories are unrelated, that people possess a stable character, that the economy as 
a whole functions predictably etc.  
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large lenders worry only how their debtors’ combined effect appears in their 
overall portfolio. In other words, if some debtors are overcharged for a loan 
because the record shows them less creditworthy than they are, it is little conso-
lation for those borrowers that there are other debtors whose record err in the 
opposite direction. For the lender, however, these errors cancel out and under-
charging some clients makes little difference overall, as long as others are 
willing to pay more than they should.  
Error propagation points out that the error in credit ratings then will influ-
ence off-label calculations as well. If data on which the ratings are based have 
faults, ratings themselves will be biased and when they are reused in their new 
context they will remain faulty. The measurement error will not go away even 
if the off-label calculation, while using the same characteristics, calculates its 
own weights (ߚ′).  
ܱ௧=ߚ′(ܺ௧ + ߝ௧) + ݁ᇱ௧= ߚ′ܺ௧ + ߚ′ߝ௧ + ݁ᇱ௧ 
Even if the measurement error is random and is unrelated to X for a set of cases, 
the error for a particular case will be strongly related for the same case across 
various off-label calculations. In other words, if the characteristics used to 
evaluate a person, company or country are faulty all the evaluations based on 
those characteristics will be biased in the same direction for that actor (Gal-
lagher 2006). This way, an error in a person’s credit record, wrong information 
about a corporate issuer or sovereign will distort all assessments based on those 
data.  
4.  Enhanced Performativity 
Ratings, however, not just describe but also shape reality. They have conse-
quences, which is why ratings exist in the first place. Ratings guide actions of 
lenders and, in principle, they help avoid bad borrowers and aid in recognizing 
good ones. Yet ratings also have effects on the very thing they are supposed to 
assess; they do influence creditworthiness. Borrowers, be they individuals or 
corporations, receiving bad ratings will have difficulty finding new credit on 
favorable terms or any credit at all. Tough conditions meted out as punishment 
for earlier non-payments make it harder to meet payment obligations later and 
will make nonpayment more likely. This is why the corporate rating agencies 
claim they cannot give timely downgrades: they do not want to push an already 
troubled company further into the abyss. Bad rating is not just a consequence of 
poor creditworthiness but it can be its cause as well (Manso 2013). This can 
lead to a vicious cycle: bad borrowers can become worse and worse, even if 
their circumstances or intentions do not change at all. 
It is equally true that a good rating can result in credit that is more favorable 
and thus making it easier to keep one’s good rating. This virtuous cycle can be 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  58 
as self-sustaining as the vicious one, although the cycles don’t go on forever, 
and at one point will come to a stop. Performativity in virtuous cycles may 
mask fundamental weaknesses for some time and may result in over-borrowing 
and then financial troubles that stop the upward spiral. Vicious cycles too can 
end, as undervalued fundamentals may eventually put a break on the downward 
slide. 
ܴ௧=ߚܺ௧ + ݁௧ 
ܺ௧ = ߛଵܴ௧ିଵ + ߛଶߠ௧ିଵ + ݁′௧ 
Ratings are caused by the characteristics observed, but those characteristics are 
a function of earlier ratings and some other factors (θt-1). When used off-label, 
to judge (some of) those other factors, those ratings also become influenced by 
earlier ones. 
ߠ௧ିଵ = ߣଵܴ௧ିଶ + ݁′′௧ିଵ 
And hence, ratings will be driven to a large extent by earlier ratings 
ܴ௧=ߚߛଵܴ௧ିଵ + ߚߛଶߣଵܴ௧ିଶ + (ߚߛଶ݁′′௧ିଵ + ߚ݁′௧ + ݁௧) 
Ratings are both descriptive and performative, and through the positive feed-
back, the rating helps its own accuracy as the rating turns into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Performativity may not be good for the borrower or the lender9, but 
it is good for the rating, at least in the short run.  
One can argue that performativity of ratings is both inevitable and unim-
portant, or, at least, not substantial enough to counterbalance the desirable 
properties of a well-constructed rating system, the same way as using antibiot-
ics does far more good than the bad it causes by slowly building up resistance 
to it in common strains of bacteria. Furthermore, bad ratings are likely to have 
a deterrent effect. Receiving a bad rating may keep borrowers in line and once 
they get out of line, the penalty of bad rating protects future lenders even if it 
makes it harder for the offender to meet the missed obligation.  
The extent to which ratings are performative depends on how important they 
are for the debtor, how much they influence their lives beyond credit. Does a 
bad rating make only credit more expensive, as intended, or does it make other 
things more costly as well? Is it just a penalty or a more pervasive force that 
influences directly the debtor’s earning power, not just requiring more payment 
                                                             
9  The vicious cycle may deprive the lender from the payment he is due. A non-payment on a 
different account that results in lower scores and higher charges on that account will drain 
resources away from the accounts that were paid promptly and now they may go into de-
fault. Vicious cycles also squeeze potential good customers out of the market. 
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for the loan but also further undercutting the debtor’s ability to service the 
debt?10 Off-label use makes ratings more important and influential. 
5.  Consumer Ratings 
In this paper we will focus on consumer credit ratings known as credit scores. 
Individuals, unlike corporations, live in multiple worlds that are often sharply 
delineated and are evaluated by multiple criteria such as emotional, aesthetic, 
moral, hedonic or intellectual, not just economic ones. Off-label use, therefore, 
is easier to demonstrate for them than for corporations that are first and fore-
most economic creatures. In our conclusion, however, we will speculate what 
general lessons we may draw for corporate and sovereign ratings. 
5.1  Credit Scores 
Credit scores were introduced in the US during World War II, when banks lost 
many of their skilled credit officers to the war effort. The credit scorecard was 
an attempt to make do with an unskilled staff by providing clear instructions on 
how to decide on credit applications. Credit scoring was then developed into a 
statistical instrument by engineer Bill Fair and mathematician Earl Isaac, who 
founded the Fair, Isaac Company (FICO) in 1956. Credit scoring, however, did 
not become standard industry practice until the U.S. Congress passed the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974. In the rules of its implementation, the 
Federal Reserve stipulated that lenders who use empirically derived demon-
strably and statistically sound credit scores to make loan decisions would be 
immune to discrimination suits. Lenders initially reluctant to hand over lending 
decisions to computers quickly understood the benefits of this legal protection 
and as computer technology advanced and became more helpful and afforda-
ble, credit scoring became standard practice in consumer lending. In 1995 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac adopted the FICO score as part of its underwrit-
ing, making credit scores indispensable in mortgage lending. By then all three 
large consumer credit registries (Equifax, Experian and TransUnion) used 
FICO to distill credit histories into a single number.  
Today, the FICO credit score is based on only credit behavior entered in the 
registry, and is often referred to as behavior score and according to FICO, does 
not include any socio-demographic variable. Lenders can have their own scor-
ing models, but ECOA and its later amendments are very specific about what 
information these models can and cannot include. Credit scores are calculated 
using a prediction function that uses a set of predictor variables to locate an 
                                                             
10  The debt bondage and debtors’ prisons were ways to address this very problem. Maiming or 
killing debtors would have left lenders without the ability to recover their losses. 
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individual on a scale assigning a score that expresses the likelihood that the 
would-be borrower will pay his debt on time. The statistical function linking 
the predictors to this outcome is most commonly a nonlinear probability func-
tion, such as logistic regression.11 In all cases, the calculation of the score in-
volves comparing the applicant to earlier applicants whose handling of their 
loan is already known and who were similar to the current applicant when they 
applied for the loan.  
5.2  Error 
Quality problems of the data on which FICO scores are based have been well 
documented and have a long history. Aggregate data presented in 1989 by the 
Associated Credit Bureaus12 about its members showed that consumers re-
quested some 9 million credit reports, or about two percent of the 450 million 
reports generated annually at that time. They disputed about 3 million of those 
reports and about 2 million were altered in the verification process.13 A later 
study by a consumer advocate group (Cassady and Mierzwinski 2004) asked 
adults in 30 states to order their credit reports and complete a survey on the 
reports’ accuracy.14 They found that 25 percent of the credit reports surveyed 
contained serious errors that could result in the denial of credit, such as false 
delinquencies or accounts that did not belong to the consumer. A more recent 
study from 2005 by the Government Accounting Office (GAO 2005) found 
that 18 percent of those surveyed had disputed data on their records and 69 
percent of those were subsequently corrected. As providing data to the credit 
bureaus is voluntary, lenders often ignore requests for using the standard format. 
Lenders can be also selective in reporting following their own interest, and 
because it is voluntary, credit bureaus are not in a strong position to enforce 
accuracy standards. With increasing concentration in lending, the largest lenders 
have also less and less incentive to share information with smaller lenders, who 
have little to offer to but much more to gain from the credit bureaus (Rona-Tas 
and Guseva 2014).  
One serious problem, that all lenders wish did not exist, is “broken records.” 
Data are provided to credit bureaus on transactions involving accounts with a 
particular lender and a borrower. The transaction then must be added to the 
                                                             
11  There are many other statistical functions that one can use, including discriminant analysis, 
probit regression, neural networks models, genetic algorithm, as well as linear programming, 
recursive partitioning algorithm, support vector machine and nearest neighbor analysis. 
12  ACB is a trade association representing consumer reporting agencies. Now ACB is called the 
Consumer Data Industry Association (<http://www.cdiaonline.org>). 
13  Some of these changes were the result of the routine updating of files with the most cur-
rent information. 
14  The study may overestimate problems for reasons of self-selection into the sample and 
because it accepts the person’s judgment about the veracity of the information.  
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record of the individual borrower. Broken records are created when transac-
tions are mismatched with persons. There are two types of broken records: the 
first is where information for a person is filed in two or more separate records, 
as if he were two or more people. The second is when pieces of information 
about different persons are filed as if they belonged to the same person. Matching 
information with people is especially challenging in the U.S. because there is no 
national identity card or identification number and the only unique identifier is 
one’s Social Security Number issued for pension and tax purposes. Even though 
the law until the 1980s explicitly prohibited their use as personal identification, 
today the Social Security Number is used for identification by credit bureaus 
along with many other institutions. Other identifiers are especially unreliable in 
the U.S., as Americans move often and addresses and phone numbers change 
quickly. Furthermore, in a country of immigrants, names are constantly mis-
spelled.15 Credit bureaus use complex algorithms to match incoming information 
– that does not necessarily include the Social Security Number – with the proper 
record, but still about five to ten percent of the records are broken. The growing 
problem of identity theft will result in even more broken records.  
In 2004, Avery, Calem, and Canner of the Federal Reserve Board conducted 
a study on data accuracy and its effect on access to credit using a sample of 
credit records of 301,000 individuals. They found among other things that 2.7 
percent of the large creditors reported only negative information and failed to 
provide positive data. Six percent of large creditors did not report small delin-
quencies. Some large lenders, such as Sallie Mae, the biggest provider of stu-
dent loans, withheld information altogether from two of the three credit bu-
reaus, and credit limits, an important piece of information,16 were missing from 
19 percent of revolving accounts affecting 46 percent of individuals in the 
sample. Moreover, data from collection agencies were reported inconsistently 
(sometimes a report was filed sometimes it was not) and collection information 
was often duplicated when collection claims were transferred from one collec-
tion agency to another, creating multiple derogatory information for a single 
offense.17 And, finally, the inquiries initiated by the subject almost never indi-
cated the type of loan the applicant sought, therefore, in 99 percent of the cases 
it was impossible to distinguish “rate shopping” from rejections.18 The Federal 
                                                             
15 The credit report of the author from Experian lists nine variants of his name. His report from 
Experian is filed under a wrong name and his correct name is listed as “formerly known as.” 
16  Calculation of credit utilization depends on knowing the credit limit. Someone who has a 
balance of $1000 on a credit card with a credit line of $1000 will be judged differently than 
someone who has the same outstanding amount with $100,000 available in credit. 
17  Records of medical collections – one of the most common type – are especially error prone. 
18  Credit records include the number of inquiries submitted for that record to the bureau. Too 
many inquiries relative to the number of loans extended will lower the credit score, unless 
the inquiries are for the same purpose within a three-week window, in which case, they are 
considered “rate shopping,” and have no effect on the score. Many inquiries against few 
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Trade Commission has conducted five reports between 2004 and 2012 on the 
accuracy of credit histories and found various discrepancies. In its latest, 2012 
study, the Federal Trade Commission found that 21 percent of consumers had 
identified errors that subsequently resulted in a change in their record,19 13 
percent had a change that affected their credit score and five percent of con-
sumers moved into a lower risk tier in a way that would make a significant 
difference in future borrowing (FTC 2012).20 
Finally, the authors of the report observed that the overall effect of bad data 
varied for different social groups. The ones that were most hurt by bad data 
were the young, the poor, minorities and those with lower credit scores and 
thinner credit files. Thin credit files means that there are little data that can be 
used to predict the loan applicants’ future behavior. There are various ways that 
credit bureaus deal with what they call “thin files,” and most involve an attempt 
to predict the missing information. In effect, the credit bureau must guess a coun-
terfactual: what kind of credit history this person would have had, had he had 
one. That introduces a new type of error, a guessing error, in the predictors.21 
Errors are mostly not random mistakes but they are the results of the social 
conditions that generate the data in the registries and are driven by the fact that 
the registries are first and foremost there to serve lenders. 
5.3  Performativity 
Data on performativity of credit scores are much weaker. Separating the two 
directions of causation, one going from behavior to score and the other pointing 
from score to behavior, is difficult. The empirical complexity is further exacer-
bated by the problem of adverse selection (Akerlof 1970; Stiglitz and Weiss 
1980), the tendency that worse borrowers with higher bent for not paying are 
more likely to take on loans offered with worse conditions, knowing well they 
will not pay it back anyway. There is evidence, however, that loan conditions 
have an effect on customers’ subsequent payment behavior and since credit 
scores decide the terms given to borrowers, credit scores, with the intervention 
of credit conditions, indirectly influence credit behavior. In one study, Karlan 
and Zinman (2009) show that higher interest rates and faster repayment sched-
                                                                                                                                
loans are thought to reflect some bad information not in the registry but that lenders found 
out somehow. 
19  The three companies are notoriously recalcitrant when it comes to consumer complaints. 
Most of their customer service is outsourced to India, Chile and the Philippines, and requests 
for corrections may take years. The bureaus are better off settling court cases with the most 
persistent complainers than committing to investigating thoroughly every complaint 
brought to them (Kroft 2013; Morgenson 2014). 
 
20  The study that relied on consumers identifying and disputing errors in their own records did 
not cover mistakes that benefited them.  
21  This guessing is done by statistical estimation. 
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ules, two common consequences of lower credit scores, when randomly as-
signed to borrowers, increase the likelihood of default. In another study of 
mortgage and car loans Edelberg (2004) finds evidence that loan terms have 
independent effect on payment behavior.  
Literature assessing the debt trap created by payday lending also supplies 
some evidence. Payday lenders give short-term cash loans (typically for 30 
days) at interest rates of around 400 percent but occasionally up to 1000 annual 
percentage rate (APR) (Ernst et al. 2004; Stegman 2007). Payday borrowers 
routinely fall into a debt trap where new debts must be taken out just to finance 
earlier ones. Payday lenders have various products designed to facilitate the 
rollover or churning of loans (Parrish and King 2009), and they use a special 
scoring system by Teletrack that emphasizes payment behavior common for 
subprime clients borrowing from car title lenders, rent-to-own establishments 
and other fringe financial institutions (Agarwal et al. 2009). Payday borrowing 
itself, however, is a consequence of low FICO scores as those with poor scores 
are locked out of the traditional sources of credit. So payday lending establish-
es performativity of ratings two ways. First, the high frequency of churning 
shows that high interest rates have consequences for indebtedness and credit-
worthiness, and second, it demonstrates the power of ratings to bar people from 
less usurious sources of borrowing such as bank loans.  
6.  Off-Label Use of Consumer Credit Ratings 
The three off-label uses of consumer ratings I will discuss here are auto insur-
ance, housing rental and hiring. These do not exhaust this topic as credit ratings 
are also used by utility companies to determine rates, cell phone companies to 
establish service, the government issuing licenses or certain benefits and insur-
ance companies calculating homeowner insurance premiums.  
6.1  Auto Insurance 
One of the most controversial off-label uses of credit scores is in determining 
car insurance premiums. Since the late 1980s, insurance companies include 
credit bureau information in their calculations. Currently, over 90 percent of 
automobile insurers in the U.S. employ credit history in their decision in some 
way. Insurance companies use the credit registry like lenders do. They request 
credit histories which are then processed through a scoring mechanism, called 
insurance scoring that is similar to credit scoring. In the case of the Big Three 
credit bureaus, the technology for insurance scoring, just as for credit scores, is 
provided by Fair, Isaac Co. The main difference between credit and insurance 
scores is the outcome of interest. While for credit scores credit histories are 
modeled to predict delinquencies, for insurance scores, the same credit histories 
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are used to calculate expected future insurance claims. Because insurance 
claims are not recorded by the credit bureaus, insurance companies must build 
their own data set matching credit history from the bureaus with insurance 
claims in their own databases.  
Why do insurance companies use credit history rather than accident histories 
from the Motor Vehicle Registry (MVR), crime statistics or insurance claim 
history (the CLUE reports)?22 The main reason is that statistical correlation 
between credit history and future insurance claims appears to be higher than the 
correlation between accident history and future claims. This seems puzzling 
and the insurance industry offered a series of possible reasons.  
One set of explanations speculates that the credit score captures certain per-
sonality traits that are related to insurance related behavior. They claim that 
people with good credit history are both more responsible and stable and as a 
result, they drive more cautiously and are more prudent in general. This argu-
ment is based on a speculative causal narrative, and the only empirical evi-
dence for this narrative is the correlation it is purported to explain. 
There seems to be another, more plausible explanation. One must keep in 
mind, that insurance claims and actual accidents are not the same. There are 
accidents without claim, because people don’t claim all accidents for various 
reasons, one of which is to keep their premiums down forgoing immediate 
financial relief for a long-term gain. Unclaimed accidents are invisible to insur-
ance companies. People who can afford the financial shock of paying the costs 
of a minor accident out of pocket, will rather do that than see their insurance 
premium rise. Poor people, on the other hand, will more likely use their insur-
ance because they cannot afford even a small repair bill. This suggests that 
credit history is a measure of poverty; low income people are more likely to 
have a checkered history of debt payment and more likely to need insurance to 
pay for harm they caused or suffered from others who are uninsured or cannot 
be identified. By using credit scores, the insurance company has a proxy for 
income and can set higher rates for poor people anticipating more claims.  
Then there are claims without accident; these are false claims. As credit 
scores predict claims and not actual accidents, another possible explanation for 
the correlation is that people who don’t pay their loans are the kind of people 
who make false – and therefore more numerous – claims. This again is likely to 
be correlated with having low socio-economic status. 
Another justification dispenses with the causal reasoning and simply points 
out the poor quality of alternative data sources. Studies show that Motor Vehi-
                                                             
22  There are a series of court cases where customers question the legality and logic of using 
credit information for setting prices in an area that seems completely unrelated to credit 
but so far with little success. In its June 4, 2007 ruling the Supreme Court in Safeco v. Burr 
decided that insurance companies do not even have to disclose if an applicant received a 
worse rate or was turned down because of his credit score. 
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cle Registries are inaccurate missing 10 to 20 percent of traffic violations 
(Hartwig and Wilikinson 2003, 8).23 So the credit record – based on voluntary 
reporting of lenders – is thought to be more reliable than the records kept by 
the government bureaucracy. Yet we have already seen that credit histories are 
fraught with errors. It is hard to believe that there is strong evidence for the 
superiority of the quality of credit records. 
What remains is the empirical correlation between scores and insurance 
claims. Statistical studies on the predictive power of credit scores, however, are 
rather unsophisticated (Kellison et al. 2003; Wu and Guszcza 2003; Tilling-
hast-Towers Perrin 1997; Monaghan 2000; AAA 2002). They tend to show the 
correlation for group aggregates not for individuals.24 This highly inflates corre-
lation because a large portion of individual error is erased by the averages. In 
other cases, studies use enormous samples of individual cases to find statistically 
significant relationships but say nothing about goodness of fit statistics or the 
net contribution of credit history to overall prediction.25 
There are other reasons why insurance companies rely on credit scores. In 
many states insurance rates are strongly regulated and rate changes and rating 
rules must be filed for approval, while underwriting rules are not. Most insur-
ances have three rate tiers: preferred, standard and non-standard. Credit scoring 
is used in the process of underwriting, that is in deciding whether to offer in-
surance and in which tier. While ratings and rating rules (how much one has to 
pay once in a tier) is strongly scrutinized by regulators, underwriting rules (in 
which tier one should be placed) are not. To raise insurance premiums is easier 
by changing underwriting guidelines and classifying people in a different cate-
gory than raising premium for their category (Birnbaum 2003). Credit scores 
with their continuous range are easy to manipulate because the insurance com-
pany can simply raise minimum score to qualify for a better tier, and push 
people into a worse one, where they have to pay more. Moreover, if credit 
scores are measures of affluence, they also help insurance companies to find 
customers more likely to purchase multiple services, and people tied with sev-
eral insurance products to a company are less likely to shop around for better 
deals. People with higher credit scores, will be richer, more likely to want 
several products and will be more loyal. All of this has little to do with insur-
ance risk and a lot more with profitability.  
                                                             
23  It is not clear how this fact was derived. 
24  For instance, they present the average loss ratios for credit score groups and correlate those 
averages with the midpoints of the groups. 
25  In a large enough sample, any correlation, no matter how small, can be shown to be signifi-
cant. 
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6.2  Rental 
If lower credit scores make people pay more for insurance, they also put them 
at a disadvantage when they want to rent a house or an apartment. Landlords 
have at their disposal a series of tenant screening services offered for a fee by 
several hundred companies. Reports typically include four types of infor-
mation: residential history, criminal background check, civil litigation (espe-
cially eviction cases) and credit reports. Some providers offer tenant scoring 
creating a FICO-like single number to predict the likelihood of renting to a 
problem tenant.26 Tenant screening agencies are much less regulated than credit 
bureaus and are even more error prone (Dunn and Grabchuk 2010, 327-31).27  
Even landlords who do not use these services are likely to check credit rec-
ords of prospective renters. They want to know if the applicant who wants to 
rent their house or apartment is in good financial health and if he manages his 
finances reliably. A large indebtedness indicates that the tenant is already in 
financial difficulty and therefore he is more likely to fall behind on rent pay-
ments. Thus, delinquencies in servicing loans in the past may be a sign of de-
linquencies in paying rent in the future. Moreover, many landlords look at 
credit history as a measure of character and general reliability. Credit bureaus, 
like TransUnion, offer their own tenant scoring based on their credit records 
effectively reweighting their credit score models.28 Equifax sells additional 
information with credit reports to landlords as a package.29 Experian has its 
own rental screening operation and claims that in addition to using credit scores 
to predict rental behavior, rental data are included in its credit reports.30 
Credit reports and scores are also used to screen people for federally subsi-
dized housing. The US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) recommends for owners and managers of such housing units to use 
credit history information. Its guidebook HUD states that “[t]he applicant 
                                                             
26  One provider, for instance, offers a 3-digit rental score that is scaled like the FICO score 
(300-850) and includes the credit score in its calculation. See <http://myrental.com/reports/ 
tenant-score/> (Accessed February 8, 2017). 
27  For instance, suppose a tenant has a dispute with the landlord and feels that she is entitled 
to withhold some of her rent, but they cannot agree how much. If the case goes to court, 
and the final judgment lets her keep 90 percent of the rent, this will be entered in New York 
State as a judgment against the tenant, as she still has to pay 10 percent (Lebovits and Ad-
donizio 2012). In many cases, eviction reports include only the fact that there was an un-
lawful detainer suit, but not the outcome (Dunn and Grabchuk 2010). Furthermore, unlike 
the large credit bureaus, of which there are three, tenant screening agencies number in the 
hundreds, each with its own database. For consumers to monitor the quality of the tenant 
data these agencies keep on them and act preemptively is impossible. 
28  <http://www.transunion.com/corporate/business/solutions/propertymgt/scoring-
model.page> (Accessed May 14, 2016). 
29  <http://www.equifax.com/help/forlandlords/> (accessed May 14, 2016). 
30  <http://www.experian.com/rentbureau/renter-credit.html> (accessed May 14, 2016). This 
takes us to turbo performativity to be discussed later. 
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should have a neutral or good record for a recommendation of admission…” 
but also stipulates that a “lack of credit history will not have any bearing on 
eligibility” (HUD 2003, 56; also Brown 2005). 
The use of credit ratings in rental decisions creates another avenue of error 
propagation and enhanced performativity. Weak credit records can result in 
denial of housing, higher deposit requirements and a worse rent-to-value ratio. 
Paying more for worse housing can exacerbate the financial difficulties that 
lowered the scores to begin with.  
6.3  Hiring 
Employers are also heavy users of credit registries. The Fair Credit Reporting 
Act stipulates that they, just as landlords but unlike insurance companies, must 
receive written consent from the person involved. Employers often use credit 
histories to decide on new hires but they can inquire about current employees 
for any reason (but, again, only with their consent). An employer receives the 
standard credit report, except with the date of birth omitted.31 At hiring, the 
credit history in certain cases is only one part of a more complex background 
check that may include the verification of educational credentials (not included 
in the credit file), employment history (only the name of the employer is in-
cluded but not position) and even an investigation of civil and criminal judg-
ments against the applicant and medical history (some of which may be reflect-
ed in the credit file). The employer, therefore, often uses multiple consumer 
reporting agencies, not just credit bureaus. 
Upsurge in using credit checks by employers in employment decisions coin-
cided with the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, which banned the 
use of polygraphs in employee hiring (Jones and Terris 1991). The loss of this 
tool spurred employers to reach for new instruments made available by ad-
vances in information technology. The initial theory was that credit reports are 
useful because people in financial trouble are more likely to resort to theft at 
the workplace (Oppler et al. 2008). Soon, the relationship between credit and 
work behavior became glossed in a more generalized fashion: financial history 
was seen as an objective measure of a person’s conscientiousness and integrity 
(Bernerth 2012). A 2009 study of 433 firms by the Society for Human Re-
source Management found that 60 percent of the companies conducted credit 
background checks of job candidates, and 13 percent did it for all job openings. 
Of those companies, who used this tool selectively, almost all vetted the finan-
cial history of prospective employees for positions with financial and fiduciary 
responsibilities, and almost half for any senior executive position, and about a 
third with responsibilities involving confidential information (SHRM 2010).  
                                                             
31  This is to prevent age discrimination. 
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Yet evidence for the predictive power of individual credit ratings to forecast 
job performance is weak or non-existent (Martin 2010; Aamodt 2010; Bryan 
and Palmer 2012). On the other hand, there is evidence that credit scores are 
correlated with minority status, thus suggesting that the use of credit history is 
a covert form of discrimination (Fellowes 2006; Bernerth 2012; Traub 2013), a 
concern equally present for the other off-label uses. 
The use of credit information became especially problematic after the great 
recession that followed the subprime mortgage crisis. As more and more people 
defaulted on mortgages, their FICO score got downgraded, so that before 2008 
15 percent of the population had scores below 600, after 2008 25 percent did. 
At the same time, the economic crisis made many lose their jobs who now 
found themselves in a financial “death spiral: the worse their debts, the harder 
it is to get a job to pay them off” (Glater 2009; Schoen 2010; McNamara 2010; 
Miller 2010). Employers insist that they avoid this Catch-22 by using common 
sense as they look at the reasons of the delinquencies, and treat credit problems 
due to unpaid medical bills differently than those rooted in gambling. Yet their 
main argument, unsupported by evidence, is that financial trouble gives incen-
tives for people to engage in mischief.  
7.  From Enhanced to Turbo Performativity: Connecting 
Records 
What we have seen so far was a loop that was completed by the individual when 
applying for a job, renting an apartment or taking out insurance. For most people, 
these are routine and necessary decisions; employment, home and insurance are 
hard to avoid. Yet the feedback loop can be attenuated or broken by the discretion 
of the employer, who can decide to hire someone with a low credit score, or a 
landlord who is not obliged to hold a poor score against a prospective tenant, and 
even insurance companies can decide to offer a better deal for good drivers with a 
checkered credit record. Moreover, difficulties finding employment, housing, or 
higher insurance premiums do not automatically translate into lower credit 
scores. For instance, help from family and friends can cushion the financial hard-
ship of people who have started on this downward spiral and may allow them to 
climb back up. The loop is far from ironclad.  
However, the death spiral is further exacerbated if not only credit records 
are used off-label, but if the off-label use is then fed back directly into the data 
that credit ratings rely on. The feedback loop would become even tighter dis-
pensing with the attenuating social contingencies and mechanisms. For in-
stance, if credit ratings were used to establish the size of rental deposits and 
insurance premiums, and then those numbers would be used to compute credit 
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ratings then we would come full circle.32 This has yet to happen, and currently 
higher insurance premiums or rental deposits affect credit scores only indirect-
ly, by diverting funds from credit payments.  
Yet in one area, employment, direct feedback is being constructed by adding 
employment records to credit history further amplifying enhanced performa-
tivity. In May 2007, Equifax, one of the three giant consumer credit bureaus 
purchased a little known company, named TALX for 1.4 billion dollars. TALX 
is the country’s largest payroll outsourcing firm.33 It claims to have payroll data 
of 190 million employee records, covering a third of the US workforce, from 
about 2,000 large employers that include the US Postal Service, the Federal and 
State governments, most universities and colleges, all car manufacturers, 
McDonald’s and all the major fast food companies just to name a few.34 
Equifax justified its acquisition with the value of the proprietary data TALX 
possesses.35 Equifax wanted to use payroll data to enhance its credit files. A 
change in pay or job title could then be reflected in one’s credit score immedi-
ately. In 2008, Equifax acquired Discover Source, a company processing IRS 
data, and in 2009, for 124 million dollars IXI, a company that gathers wealth 
data on consumers. A year later Equifax rolled out Decision 360, an example of 
turbo performativity, a new, comprehensive rating product that includes in-
come and wealth information along with credit history. All this is legal under 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. This law, among other things, allows 
financial companies to engage in a variety of businesses, and permits affiliated 
companies to share personal information on clients.  
Decision 360 “combines credit, macroeconomic and customer-centric in-
formation with a vast array of exclusive data to deliver the most complete 
picture of consumer financial health available.” As the brochure explains: 
The financial landscape is increasingly complex. As a result, traditional risk 
management tools may no longer provide all the insight needed to make truly 
informed lending decisions. How a consumer managed past credit is im-
portant, but so is their willingness, ability and capacity to pay current and fu-
ture obligations. In this new normal, what you need is not just a consumer “li-
ability statement,” but a more telling “income/balance sheet” and cash flow 
statement – often driven by consumer consent. [Emphasis added.] 
                                                             
32  Enhancing credit scores with new types of information is seen as the main way to improve 
scores. One example of such innovation is using social network data for predicting credit 
behavior. FICO announced such plans, and in August 2015, Facebook acquired a patent that 
would use credit information of an applicant‘s Facebook friends to calculate a better credit 
score (Patent# US 20140289815 A1). Facebook sensing popular backlash, at least for now, 
decided against implementation.  
33  In 2012, Equifax renamed TALX to Equifax Workforce Solutions.  
34  Details can be found at <www.theworknumber.com> (Accessed May 14, 2016). 
35  Rick Smith, CEO of Equifax, conference call for investors, on February 15, 2007, 
<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/917524/000110465907011669/0001104659-07-
011669.txt> (Accessed May 14, 2016). 
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Equifax boasts that  
the Decision 360 practice draws from a wealth of unique data sources and in-
sights that include:  
- Exclusive access to more than $10 trillion in investable asset data [IXI]. 
- 195+ million active employment records from more than 2,000 U.S. employ-
ers [TALX]. 
- Tax transcript information, delivered in 24-48 hours, verified directly from 
the IRS [Discover Source/TALX]. 
- SSN verification based on searches of more than 15 billion public/private da-
tabases, and authenticated by the Social Security Administration. 
- An extensive credit reporting database of more than 250 million consumer 
records [Equifax’s original credit registry].36  
The turbo performativity of comprehensive scores also amplify error propaga-
tion. An erroneous downgrade in credit scores that then produces an adverse 
employment decision is counted twice by Decision 360. 
8.  Conclusion 
Off-label use of consumer credit ratings results in error propagation and en-
hanced performativity. When different metrics are tightly coupled small events 
can have enormous consequences and inflate initial inequalities. In the world of 
consumer credit, privacy laws loosen the link between different markets. Mak-
ing car insurance, rental and hiring more independent from credit ratings bene-
fits not just those who start out with a weaker rating and find it increasingly 
hard to get a job, a good insurance or rental, but also those who are on the other 
side of these transactions. By letting insurance companies use credit ratings, 
lenders may see their struggling borrowers’ resources diverted into higher 
insurance premiums and away from meeting their credit obligations. In other 
words, off-label use creates new competition between lenders and other users 
of the ratings for the resources of customers sucked in the vortex of indebted-
ness. Privacy protection that limits the use of credit scores to their original 
purpose, protects customers as well as lenders and makes these markets less 
bifurcated and volatile.  
Economic literature interested in the welfare implications of off-label use 
and consumer privacy is focusing on models of single markets (Calzolari and 
Pavan 2004; Akçura and Srinivasan 2005; Taylor 2004 and Jentzsch 2014). My 
two theoretical points are at odds with this literature for three reasons. First, 
off-label use connects two or more markets and each market may work perfect-
ly well but their externalities spill over to and harm other markets. It may be 
                                                             
36  <http://www.equifax.com/pdfs/corp/Decision-360-Brochure_051010.pdf> (Accessed May 
14, 2016). 
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perfectly rational even optimal to use credit scores in loan and hiring decisions, 
but the credit and the job market are linked and decisions in one affects condi-
tions in the other. If low scores exclude people from jobs, that makes it harder 
for lenders to recover their money from their unemployed clients. Second, 
models optimize expected utilities, in other words, want to find the largest 
average gain. The processes described here, while they may be optimal with 
respect to the average (first statistical moment), are suboptimal in the second 
statistical moment: they fail to minimize variance. They create divergence in 
outcomes in a way that amplifies small initial differences. Errors may cancel 
out overall, some actors will be over- others will be underrated, but over time, 
the same actors will be stuck with the worse-than-deserved ratings, just as the 
same actors will get to keep their better-than-deserved ratings. The resulting 
inequalities (variation in economic outcomes) and their ill effects are invisible 
in models that focus on averages and ignore variances. Third, most economists 
are concerned with one-period models, when the real process unfolds in multiple 
periods over time. 
The European Union, with strong laws defending personal data,37 is current-
ly grappling with regulating off-label use of personal information,38 and is 
much more alert to its dangers than the United States. Yet, even in Europe, the 
problem is framed in terms of privacy. In this paper, we try to argue that there 
is another, equally serious issue that needs to be considered, and that is cumula-
tive economic disadvantages, an issue which goes beyond the individual’s 
feelings of discomfort disclosing a particular piece of information in a specific 
transaction for fear of ill-intentioned abuse. Our claim is that the seemingly 
perfectly reasonable and well-meaning use of private information, even with 
the consent of the individual can have adverse societal consequences.  
Because the two mechanisms that we identified act for corporations and 
sovereign states as well, albeit in different ways, some of these findings can be 
extended to corporate and sovereign ratings even though they are not natural 
persons and have no privacy rights. Error propagation for instance, is a concern 
when faulty corporate ratings are used for regulatory purposes. An independent 
regulatory assessment of RMBSs or CDOs would have increased the chances 
of revealing their flaws in time (for instance, that many RMBSs were based on 
mortgages with no (verified) income data). For companies (as opposed to struc-
tured financial investment vehicles whose performance is directly unaffected 
                                                             
37  The Data Protection Directive of 1995 issued by the European Commission (Directive 
95/46/EC) states that personal data must be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes” allowing for 
exceptions only for historical, statistical and scientific use with appropriate safeguards (Ar-
ticle 6.1(b)). 
38  The Opinion of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on purpose limitation, issued on 
April 2, 2013 available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documen 
tation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf> (Accessed May 14, 2016). 
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by their rating) enhanced performativity emerges as good ratings beget not just 
new investors reacting to the rating signal but – courtesy of the regulations – 
more conservative investors such as pension funds, whose presence is now an 
additional indication that the company is doing well, that then makes their 
access to capital easier which helps performance, leading to even better ratings. 
Ratings of government bonds also become a direct measure of stability and the 
overall performance of a country’s economy. Reacting to bad ratings investors 
will avoid the country’s bonds or will demand a higher risk premium making 
governments even weaker fiscally. But if these ratings are used to assess the 
entire economy and polity, foreign investors will take a pass also on private 
companies in the country creating new weaknesses in the economy that bring 
worse prospects for the government and its borrowing. Again, an independent 
political and economic assessment may lead investors in a different direction. 
Using information in new ways is one of the most common forms of intel-
lectual creativity. Innovation in applied and academic research often turns on 
smart ideas of how to use existing data off-label. Yet off-label uses can have 
serious side effects. Ratings are designed to bring stability to credit markets. 
Their spread to off-label uses while in the short-run can enhance their predic-
tive powers, in the long run, because ratings also propagate errors and reinforce 
and magnify economic inequalities, contribute not only to a society that is less 
just but also to one that is ultimately less stable. 
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